Solution uniqueness is an important property for a bargaining model. Rubinstein's (1982) seminal 2-person alternating-offer bargaining game has a unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium outcome. Is it possible to obtain uniqueness results in the much enlarged setting of multilateral bargaining with a characteristic function? In an exploratory effort, this paper investigates a model first proposed in Okada (1993) in which each period players have equal probabilities of being selected to make a proposal and bargaining ends after one coalition forms. Focusing on transferable utility environments and Stationary Subgame Perfect Equilibria (SSPE), we find ex ante SSPE payoff uniqueness for large classes of characteristic functions. This study includes as a special case a variant of the legislative bargaining model in Baron and Ferejohn (1989) , and our results imply (unrestricted) SSPE payoff uniqueness in this case.
Introduction
Solution uniqueness is an important property for a bargaining model. Rubinstein's (1982) seminal 2-person alternating-offer bargaining game has a unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium outcome. A considerable literature exists that generalizes Rubinstein (1982) to the n-person dividing-a-pie problem, producing equilibrium uniqueness results of various strengths. Noteworthy studies include Merlo and Wilson (1995) and Krishna and Serrano (1996) , and a brief survey can be found in the introduction of Chatterjee and Sabourian (2000) .
Is it possible to obtain uniqueness results in the still richer setting of bargaining with a characteristic function (i.e. coalitional bargaining), which, unlike the dividing-a-pie problem where only the grand coalition has a positive pie, allows subsets of players to have positive pies as well? This question motivates this exploratory study.
It turns out that there is little in the dividing-a-pie literature that we can build upon, because in our setting, coalition formation plays an important role in determining payoffs from bargaining. Previous studies in this setting either seek to support all core allocations as equilibrium outcomes (see Yan (2003) for a brief review) or focus on the efficiency properties of the proposed bargaining models (Chatterjee et al. (1993) , Okada (1993) and Okada (1996) ). as Okada (1993) , and reports strong uniqueness results regarding (ex ante) equilibrium payoffs for a considerable range of games, including simple games, symmetric games, convex games and strictly monotone games that admit an efficient equilibrium. Naturally, payoff uniqueness restricts the equilibrium pattern of coalition formation. For Okada's (1993) model, except when players are indifferent about which coalition to nominate, equilibrium payoff uniqueness implies a unique profile of (possibly identical) coalitions formed with equal probabilities.
We now describe the model informally. We assume that the underlying cooperative game is of transferable utility, essential, monotone, and zeronormalized. Bargaining proceeds as follows. Each period one player is randomly selected with equal probablities from all n players to make a proposal.
In her proposal the selected player nominates a coalition and announces a feasible allocation for that coalition. The coalition members then respond sequentially. The proposal passes if and only if it is accepted by all the members of the nominated coalition. If the proposal passes, the game ends, the proposed allocation is realized and each player excluded from the coalition gets zero payoff. Otherwise, the game continues into the next period with payoffs discounted by δ ∈ [0, 1), and the same bargaining procedure is followed as in the previous period. We call this game the random-proposer game.
For the rest of the paper we suppress references to the cooperative game, to the properties of which we refer instead as those of the characteristic function, so the term "symmetric game", for instance, refers to random-proposer games with symmetric characteristic functions.
SSPE Payoff Uniqueness in the Variant Baron-Ferejohn Model
This paper makes an indirect contribution to the legislative bargaining literature building on Baron and Ferejohn (1989) (henceforth BF) . When the characteristic function assigns worth 1 to all majority coalitions and 0 to the rest the random-proposer game becomes, with nonsubstantive differences 2 , a variant of the BF model, for which we obtain a stronger uniqueness result than BF.
More precisely, BF first shows that with 5 or more players any allocation can be supported in a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) for high enough δ.
This result, typical of multilateral bargaining models, has an obvious analogue (which we omitted) in the random-proposer game. BF, as do we and most of the literature, addresses such multiplicity by restricting attention to Stationary Subgame Perfect Equilibria (SSPE). BF shows payoff uniqueness within the class of SSPE restricted in the following ways: i) players do not play weakly dominated strategies and ii) they play the "simplest" SSPE satisfying i), where simplicity is made precise by Baron and Kalai (1993) , whose result implies that of all the SSPE in which players do not play weakly dominated strategies, those in BF require the least number of states if executed by automata. 3 In 2 In the original BF model, all players respond to the proposed allocation. The proposal passes if accepted by a majority. This difference in response procedure proves nonsubstantive as the analyses of the two models are similar and they produce identical allocations in equilibrium. 3 In fact Baron and Kalai (1993) show a stronger result: of all the SPE in which players do not play weakly dominated strategies the BF type SSPE require the fewest automaton states.
this paper, using simple techniques that exploit subgame perfection we show that for every general SSPE there exists a BF type SSPE that generates the same outcome; and this result, Proposition 2, can be easily adapted to the original BF model. 4 Moreover, the proof of Proposition 2 does not depend on the proposing probabilities, the discount factors, or on the size of the minimum winning coalition, consequently it can be extended to obtain unrestricted SSPE payoff uniqueness for the generalized BF model studied in Eraslan (2002).
5 4 The adaptation is straightforward and not included in this paper. 5 In Eraslan (2002) , although the SSPE is defined the same way as the general SSPE in this paper, it is clear from the analysis that only the BF class of SSPE are considered.
For instance, an assumption is made in footnote 3 to the effect that a player is to accept a proposal if the offer to her equals her continuation payoff. This assumption effectually prevents a player from conditioning her response on the identity of the proposer, or on offers made to the other players, or on prior responses made by other players. Moreover, it is assumed implicitly that players do not play weakly dominated strategies, as the arguments in Eraslan (2002) ignore the possibility that a player may reject (accept) an offer strictly higher (lower) than her continuation payoff because her vote is not pivotal. Finally, no delay is assumed implicitly, since there is no arguments ruling out those SSPE in which a proposer finds it optimal to make a proposal that she knows will be rejected as she expects to receive higher payoff when other players make proposals.
Results
We focus on SSPE, and we call the ex ante payoff profile generated by an SSPE an SSPE payoff profile.
We first demonstrate the outcome-equivalence between general SSPE and the simple, BF type SSPE, which we call the cutoff strategy SSPE. We then establish the existence of (mixed) SSPE in the general random-proposer game, although pure SSPE do not always exist.
Our uniqueness results vary in strength depending on the characteristic function. For simple games we show that all pure SSPE must be payoff equivalent. For symmetric games we show that there is a unique SSPE payoff profile. For convex games we focus on the inclusive SSPE, namely those SSPE in which proposers nominate, roughly speaking, the "largest" payoff maximizing coalitions. It is shown that all inclusive SSPE of a convex game must be pure and payoff equivalent. Our last result concerns efficient SSPE. As shown in Okada (1993) , an efficient SSPE exists for all δ ∈ [0, 1) if and only if equal division is a core allocation. Our last result shows for strictly monotone games that an efficient cutoff strategy SSPE, if it exists, is the unique cutoff strategy SSPE of the game.
Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model; Section 3 establishes the existence of SSPE and the outcome equivalence between general SSPE and cutoff strategy SSPE; Section 4 contains the main technical results used in the uniqueness proofs; Section 5 presents the uniqueness results; Section 6 discusses extensions; the appendix collects the long and the purely technical proofs.
The Random-Proposer Game
Let N denote the set of all players, and let n = |N|. A coalition is a nonempty subset of players. A characteristic function v maps each coalition S to an element in < + , and v(S) is called the worth of S, which may be interpreted as the size of the surplus available for division among members of S.
An allocation for a coalition S is an element in < |S| + , written as w = (w i ) i∈S ;
it is feasible if
v is monotone if v(T ) ≤ v(S) for any T ⊂ S, strictly monotone if the inequality is strict; v is essential if v(S) > 0 for some S; v is 0-normalized if v({i}) = 0 for all i. We maintain throughout that v is monotone, 0-normalized and essential, and we require v to be strictly monotone for the last result, Proposition 7.
The random-proposer game is as follows. Bargaining proceeds in periods 1, 2, 3, . . ., until an agreement is reached. At the beginning of each period, one player is randomly selected to be the proposer. Every player has probability 1 n of being selected in any period. Suppose in period t player i is selected.
i then makes a proposal that consists in the nomination of a coalition Swe allow i / ∈ S, although i ∈ S in equilibrium -and the announcement of a feasible allocation for S, w = (w j ) j∈S . Let (S, w) denote the proposal. We will sometimes abuse terminology and say that i "nominates j" if j ∈ S. The proposal passes immediately if S = {i}. If S\{i} 6 = ∅, sequentially all the players in S\{i} respond by accepting or rejecting the proposal. The exact order of responses is exogenous and, as can be seen shortly, immaterial to our model. If all in S\{i} accept, the proposal passes, the game ends, and each j ∈ S gets δ t−1 w j , where δ ∈ [0, 1), while each j ∈ N\S gets v({j}), which equals 0 due to 0-normalization. If at least one player in S\{i} rejects, bargaining proceeds into period t + 1 and the same bargaining procedure is repeated. If no agreement is ever reached, every player gets zero payoff.
Except Proposition 3 the results in the next two sections have been generalized in Yan (2003) , 6 nevertheless we produce the proofs for the reader's 6 The results in the next two sections first appeared in the working paper version of this convenience.
The SSPE
A strategy in a random proposer game is called stationary if it is independent of the history of past periods. 7 A Stationary Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SSPE) is a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in which players use stationary strategies. As we will discuss later, an SSPE may be "complicated" despite its stationarity. Fortunately, Proposition 2 shows that for every SSPE there exists an outcome-equivalent, "simple" SSPE. 8 Let us first define the "simple" stationary strategy profiles, which we call the cutoff strategy profiles because an important feature of these strategy profiles is that each player accepts a proposal if and only if she herself is offered at least a certain cutoff value.
Formally, let F i = {S|i ∈ S}, let P i denote the set of probability distributions over F i , and let P = Π i∈N P i . Define a (possibly mixed) cutoff strategy profile paper, which has fallen behind Yan (2003) in the publication process. We decide to claim credits to these results here instead of in Yan (2003) . 7 Here to save space we do not give a formal definition of stationarity. 8 Here we refer to the complexity or simplicity of a strategy profile rather than that of a strategy in the same spirit as Baron and Kalai (1993) , who measure the complexity of a strategy profile using the number of automaton states needed when it is executed by an automaton.
σ c by a pair (p, x), where p ∈ P and x ∈ < n + , such that player i when proposing nominates coalition S with probability p i (S), offers x j to each j ∈ S\{i}, and when responding i accepts a proposal if and only if the offer to her is at least x i . p is called the coalitional profile and x the vector of cutoff values. For each i and S ∈ F i , let g i (S, x) be the payoff to i of nominating S, that is,
We will write g i (S) in place of g i (S, x) when x is clear. Let π i be i's expected payoff when selected to propose, termed her proposer payoff , given by
be the probability of i receiving an offer from j conditional on j being selected,
where j 6 = i, and I i (S) = 1 if i ∈ S and 0 otherwise. Let q i be the ex ante probability of i receiving an offer from another player,
y be the ex ante payoff function that maps each strategy profile to the induced ex ante payoff profile, an element in < n + . It is easy to see that
Note that because σ c is stationary, player i's continuation payoff in any period t, which is defined to be her expected payoff (discounted to period t) in any subgame that begins with a proposal being rejected by some player in period t, is δy i .
The equilibrium conditions for a cutoff strategy SSPE are straightforward.
Proof: The "only if" direction is obvious. For the "if"direction, the only nontrivial step is to verify that proposers do not prefer being rejected, that is
To see this, substitute δy i for x i on the right hand side of (1), we have
, it follows that π i ≥ y i ≥ δy i since we know π i ≥ 0 as i can get 0 by nominating {i}.
Before we state Proposition 2, which shows the outcome equivalence between cutoff strategy SSPE and general SSPE, it is useful to note how the general stationary strategy profile is more complicated than the cutoff strategy profile. First, in a (mixed) general stationary strategy profile the proposing behavior may be given by an arbitrary probability measure over the proposal space ∪ S∈2 N \∅ {S}×< |S| + , allowing among other things offering the same player different values depending on the coalition nominated as well as nominating a coalition of which the proposer is not a member. Second, our definition of stationarity allows strategies to condition on the history within the current period, so when responding to a proposal a player may condition her response not only on the offer to herself but also on the identity of the proposer, on the coalition nominated, on offers made to the other coalition members, and on responses made by players preceding her. Finally, a player when responding may randomize between acceptance and rejection in a (mixed) general stationary strategy profile.
We now prepare to state Proposition 2. Given a general stationary strategy profile, consider for each player her possibly randomized proposing behavior and focus on the induced marginal distribution over the set of coalitions 2 N \∅.
We call the collection of these marginal distributions the coalitional profile, in keeping with the terminology used for cutoff strategy profiles. For each player i, let F i+ denote the set of coalitions player i nominates with positive probabilities, and let C i be the union of these coalitions.
Proposition 2 For any SSPE σ with a coalitional profile p the cutoff strategy profile σ c = (p, δy(σ)) generates the same outcome and is an SSPE.
Proof: See the appendix.
From now on we only consider cutoff strategy SSPE, which we simply call SSPE.
Next we show the existence of (mixed) SSPE for the general randomproposer game. However, pure SSPE do not always exist.
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Proposition 3 The random-proposer game has an SSPE.
. P * is convex-valued and upper-hemicontinuous by the
Here is an example of inexistence of pure SSPE for δ close enough to 1. Consider a 3-player game in which the characteristic function is zero-valued except for v ({1, 2, 3}) = 1 and v ({1, 2}) = 0.8. In pure SSPE a player when selected to propose chooses one coalition with probability 1. It is easy to see that player 1 and 2 must include each other in their chosen coalitions and player 3 must choose N . This leaves us 3 possibilities: both, one or neither of 1 and 2 choose N . The first can be ruled out as follows: the payoff profile, which can be solved for from the simultaneous equations provided by (2) , is y i = 1/3 for all i; this implies that 3 is too "expensive" to be nominated when δ is high enough since 3 increases the worth by only v({1, 2, 3})− v ({1, 2}) = 0.2 < 1/3. In the other two possibilities player 3 is too "cheap" not to be nominated as her payoffs turn out to be less than 0.2.
To see
We will show that B is convex-valued and upper-hemicontinuous. To see
Hence convexity is established.
Suppose to the contrary that B is NOT upper-hemicontinuous. Then there exists a sequence x n →x and a sequence b n →b,
. By definition there exists a sequence {p n } s.t. p n ∈ P * (x n ) ⊆ P for all n, and b n = δy(σ c (p n , x n )). Since P is compact, {p n } has a subsequence {p n k } that converges to a pointp in P . Since the subsequence {x n k } converges tox, and since P * is upper-hemicontinuous,p ∈ P * (x). Note that b 6 = δy(σ c (p,x)) since we assumedb / ∈ B(x). Since y is continuous, for large
Therefore, there exists p
Intermediate Results
The fact that we prove the existence of SSPE for general random-proposer games using Katutani's fixed-point theorem might suggest that uniqueness may also be demonstrated through familiar theorems such as the contraction theorem. Instead we find it more fruitful to use tactics often seen in the discrete branch of mathematics. The overall structure of our demonstration is that we first exhibit the pattern that must be obeyed by two payoff-nonequivalent SSPE in a general random-proposer game, then we exploit the different traits of different classes of characteristic functions and show how in each case the afore-mentioned pattern cannot hold true.
Lemma 1 below describes the pattern followed by two payoff-nonequivalent SSPE. Note from (2) that a player's SSPE payoff is determined by, and increasing in, her proposer payoff and her nomination probability. Informally, Lemma 1 i) states that players' payoffs and nomination probabilities change from one SSPE to the other in (weakly) opposite directions on the whole.
The intuition for this is that if a player has a payoff increase (decrease), she raises (lowers) her cutoff value and hence, other things equal, makes herself less (more) attractive to the proposers. Lemma 1 ii) considers those players whose only source of payoff increase is the increase in their proposer payoffs.
Roughly speaking, it states that their payoff increases do not exceed the payoff decreases of their coalition members, because the increases in their proposer payoffs come from the coalition members' lowering the cutoff values. Lemma 1 iii) is similar to Lemma 1 i) in spirit: for at least one player, her payoff and nomination probability must change in strictly opposite directions.
The following notation scheme is adopted for the rest of the paper when comparing two SSPE σ and σ 0 : let y = y(σ), y 0 = y(σ 0 ), ∆y = y 0 − y, and similarly for the other variables, and we also find it useful to define Y ++ =
To see what contributes to a payoff change, we obtain from (2)
One can see that a player's payoff change has two sources: one is the change in her proposer payoff, ∆π i , and the other is the change in her nomination probability, ∆q i . iii) ∆q j ∆y j < 0 for some j.
Corollary For any coalitional profile p ∈ P , there is at most one y ∈ R n such that the cutoff strategy profile (p, δy) is an SSPE.
Proof: Suppose to the contrary that (p, δy) is an SSPE for two different values of y, then we have two payoff-nonequivalent SSPE and Lemma 1 iii) implies ∆q j 6 = 0 for some j, which is impossible since the two SSPE have a common coalitional profile.
Next we define, for want of a better term, the proposer surplus, denoted bȳ π i , which as we shall see is equal to the proposer payoff minus the proposer's own cutoff value. Formally, defineḡ(S) = v(S) − P j∈S x j , and defineπ i =
We can express y i in terms ofπ i ,
More importantly,
iii)π i ≤ π j for any i and j.
Proof:
i) This follows directly from the fact that π i is maximized in equilibrium.
ii) j ∈ C i means that for some S ∈ F i+ , j ∈ S. So just like i, j could also nominate S, henceπ j ≥ḡ(S) =π i .
iii) Pick any S ∈ F i+ , we haveπ j ≥ḡ(S ∪ {j}) since j could nominate
by monotonicity, we haveḡ(S ∪ {j}) ≥ g(S) − δy j =π i − δy j . Henceπ j ≥π i − δy j , or π j ≥π i .
Uniqueness Results
In this section we present the uniqueness results for simple games, symmetric games, convex games and strictly monotone games that admit efficient equilibria.
Call a random-proposer game simple if for any S ⊆ N, either v(S) = 1 or v(S) = 0.
Proposition 4
The pure SSPE of a simple game, if they exist, must be payoff equivalent.
Proof: We first assert that in a simple game the ex post SSPE payoffs always add up to 1. This is because the proposer always nominates a coalition of worth 1, since otherwise she gets zero proposer payoff and hence by (2) 
On the other hand, g j (S j ) ≥ g j [(S i \{i})∪{j}] and the symmetry of i and j implies that 
S ⊂ T implies g i (T ) < g i (S). Intuitively, in inclusive SSPE players when
proposing nominate, roughly speaking in general but literally for symmetric games, the largest payoff-maximizing coalitions. If we restrict attention to inclusive SSPE, then, since the equilibrium payoff profile is unique and symmetric by Proposition 5 and hence so is the cutoff value profile, the equilibrium coalition size must also be unique.
Next we consider convex games, for which we focus on inclusive SSPE.
Formally, the random-proposer game is convex if for any S, T ⊆ N, v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩T ) ≥ v(S)+v(T ).
As shown below, convexity together with inclusiveness induces structure in the equilibrium coalitional profile, which we exploit to show payoff uniqueness. However, inclusive SSPE do not always exist: an inclusive SSPE must be pure for a convex game and as mentioned before pure SSPE may not exist.
Proposition 6
In a convex game, if σ c is an inclusive SSPE, i) σ c is pure;
ii) for each player i let S i denote the coalition nominated by i when i proposes, a. for any i and j such that j ∈ S i , we have S j ⊆ S i and y j ≥ y i ; b. ∩ i∈N S i 6 = ∅, and for any j ∈ ∩ i∈N S i , S j = ∩ i∈N S i ;
iii) if σ 0 c is another inclusive SSPE, y(σ c ) = y(σ 0 c ).
Proof: First note that convexity implies that for any S, T ⊆ N,ḡ(S ∪ T ) + g(S ∩ T ) ≥ḡ(S) +ḡ(T ).
i) σ c being pure means that F i+ is a singleton for all i. Suppose to the
, where the second "≥" follows from the optimality of nominating S 2 . On the other hand,ḡ(
where the inequality follows from
and the inclusiveness of σ c , a contradiction. Therefore σ c must be pure.
ii) a. First, fix any j ∈ S i , we will show S j ⊆ S i by an argument similar to that in i). Suppose to the contrary
where the second inequality follows from the optimality of nominating S j . On the other hand,ḡ( It follows that for any i and j such that j ∈ S i , i ∈ S k implies j ∈ S k for any k. Therefore q j ≥ q i . Since in additionπ j ≥π i by Lemma 2 ii), we must have, recalling (4), y j ≥ y i .
b. We will show ∩ i∈N S i 6 = ∅ first.
Note first that for any i, y i > 0 by Claim 3 in the proof of Proposition 2, and henceḡ(S i ) =π i > 0.
To show ∩ i∈N S i 6 = ∅, we do induction on the number of players.
Suppose to the contrary that for some i and j, S i ∩ S j = ∅, then
, which contradicts the optimality of S j . Hence we conclude for any two players i and j, S i ∩ S j 6 = ∅. Since
To see the second part of Statement b., note that for any k ∈ ∩ i∈N S i , S k ⊆ ∩ i∈N S i by Statement a. Since obviously ∩ i∈N S i ⊆ S k ,
we have S k = ∩ i∈N S i .
iii) Suppose to the contrary y(σ c ) 6 = y(σ first for any k ∈ N we can derive from (3) 10 ,
It follows that follows from (7) in the appendix, a contradiction. The proof is then complete by contraposition.
Our last result concerns efficient SSPE in strictly monotone games. An SSPE σ c is efficient if
We show that in a strictly monotone game, an efficient cutoff strategy SSPE, if it exists, is the unique cutoff strategy SSPE of the game. Note that uniqueness of the cutoff strategy SSPE implies that the general SSPE is unique up to off-equilibrium-path response behavior.
Proposition 7
In a strictly monotone game, an efficient cutoff strategy SSPE, if it exists, is the unique cutoff strategy SSPE of the game.
Proof: Let σ c denote the efficient SSPE. Since the game is strictly monotone, efficiency implies that every player when proposing nominates N with prob- are nonnegative for all i ∈ I and j ∈ J, if there exists a correspondence
a) a i < a j for any j ∈ B(i);
Proof of Claim 1: See the appendix.
Note that since ∆q i ≤ 0 for all i, by Lemma 1 iii)
Claim 2
i) |∆q i | < |∆q j | for any i and j such that j ∈ B(i);
Proof of Claim 2: See the appendix. As shown in Okada (1993) , the payoff profile generated by an efficient SSPE is equal division, namely that each player gets and regardless of the order of proposal making if and only if equal division is in the core.
It follows immediately
P Y ++ |∆q i ||∆y i | < P Y −− |∆q j ||∆y j |, contradicting
Extension
Naturally one would like to extend the uniqueness results in this paper to the multi-stage random-proposer game. Okada (1996) shows for superadditive characteristic functions that in an SSPE of the multi-stage game there is no delay in any subgame. In the literature, delay is often associated with multiplicity, in view of which Okada's (1996) result is encouraging.
Another direction for extension is to allow asymmetric proposing probabilities. Yan (2003) explores this direction and shows, interestingly, that each core allocation can be realized as the unique SSPE payoff profile of the random-proposer game with the proportionate proposing probabilities.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2: We proceed by proving a few claims about σ.
Claim 1 Following any history that ends with a proposal (S, w) being made by player j, the outcome prescribed by σ is such that a) the proposal passes if w i > δy i (σ) for all i ∈ S\ {j}; b) the proposal is rejected if w i < δy i (σ) for some i ∈ S\ {j}. Proof of Lemma 1:
Since this is true for all S ∈ F i+ , ∆π i ≥
Since this is true for all i,
ii) It follows from (3) that for any i ∈ T , since ∆q i ≤ 0 by assumption, we
. Together with (7) this implies that
Summing this over all i ∈ T , 
Note that
P i∈T ∆y i > 0 implies that
is strictly positive. This term can be positive only ifT is non-empty, becauseT consists precisely of those j for which q i 0 j (−δ∆y j ) is positive. Having thus established thatT is non-empty,
iii) First we claim that ∆q i ∆y i > 0 for some i. Suppose to the contrary ∆q i ∆y i ≤ 0 for all i. Assume w.l.g. that Y ++ 6 = ∅. We have
where the strict inequality is by ii). From this we draw two conclusions:
Y −− 6 = ∅, and P i∈N ∆y i < 0 or equivalently
i and so on) we can show
Therefore, the claim is true. Then iii) follows from i).
Proof of Claim 1 in the proof of Proposition 4: We focus on pure SSPE in this proof and need some notation to utilize this fact. Given a pure SSPE, let S i denote the coalition player i nominates with probability 1 when proposing and letq i be the number of other players nominating i. Note that
Usingq i instead of q i we rewrite two previous results. (4) is rewritten as
Note for later use that for any i ∈ N, n −q i δ − δ > 0 sinceq i ≤ n − 1 by definition, and henceπ i > 0 since y i > 0 by Claim 3 in the proof of Proposition 2.
Next, equation (3) is rewritten and used in three equivalent forms,
We prove Claim 1 in three steps.
Step 1 Assume w.l.g. that 1 ∈ Y ++ ∩ Q −− . Then ∆q 1 ≤ −1.
Obvious, sinceq i andq 0 i are integers for all i.
Step 2 ∆y i ≤ 0 implies ∆q i ≤ 0 for any i ∈ N , and ∆y i ≤ 0 implies ∆q i < 0
To show the first part of the statement, consider any j ∈ Y ++ ∩ Q −− . We
. It follows that
By Lemma 2 iii), for all i 6 = j, ∆π j =π
So ∆π i + δy implies ∆y i > 0; or equivalently, ∆y i ≤ 0 implies ∆q i < 0.
Step 3 P i∈N ∆y i < 0.
We will first show 
From this we will show P i∈Y ++ ∆q i y i < 0. Note from (9) that ∆π i + ∆q i δy i = (n −q 0 i δ − δ)∆y i for any i ∈ N. Pick k ∈ argmax i∈Y ++ ∩Q −− ∆π i + ∆q i δy i
Then for any i ∈ Y ++ ∩ Q −− ,
where the second inequality follows from the obvious fact thatq For any i ∈ Y ++ ∩ Q ++ , ∆q i ≥ 1, and hence by (11) and (9) ∆π i + ∆q i δy To complete Step 3 we will show that n P i∈N ∆y i ≤ δ 
Summing (17) over all i,
The left hand side of (18) equals δ P i∈N ∆q i y i , which is negative since we showed P i∈N ∆q i y i < 0, and the right hand side equals n P i∈N y 0 i −n P i∈N y i = n P i∈N ∆y i . Thus we conclude P i∈N ∆y i < 0.
where the last inequality is due to condition i).
Proof of Claim 2 in the proof of Proposition 7:
i) Since B is defined on Y ++ , ∆y i > 0, which implies ii) It follows directly from Lemma 1 ii).
